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Descartes' Two Accounts of Mind Body Union
Abstract
First paragraph: Descartes was committed both to the Christian doctrine of the unity of man and to an
experimentally oriented mechanistic science. Furthermore, he was committed to a dualistic metaphysics in
which humans consist of a union of mind (res cogitans) and body (res extensa), which are absolutely distinct
substances. There has been little agreement on how his explanation of union reflects his commitments. Some
philosophers argue that Descarte's primary or only account of union was the "co-extension" view because it is
compatible with the unity of man. As we will see, however, the co-extension account would not have satisfied
Descartes' scientific inclinations. Philosophers who pay serious attention to the difficulties with the co-
extension account argue that Descartes accepted or should have accepted the "natural institution" account of
union, which is compatible with his scientific commitments. However, the natural institution account is guilty
of a Platonism and arbitrariness that conflicts with the unity of man. I will argue that Descartes' desire to
accommodate all his commitments drove him to accept and be devoted to both the co-extension and the
natural institution accounts.
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